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Abstract:  This article explores the internet as a political tool in order to achieve 
political goals. In Thailand, for example, the internet has significant roles in the 
contemporary Thai political context. It demonstrates that the internet is a tool that can 
be used for political mobilizing, promoting and protecting the mainstream ideology of 
the state. This paper also argues that it has many possible uses for censorship and 
surveillance by the government. In conclusion, the internet can be considered 
political. 
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Résumé:  Cet article étudie l'Internet comme un outil pour atteindre des objectifs 
politiques. En Thaïlande, par exemple, l'Internet joue un rôle important dans le 
contexte politique thaïlandais contemporaine. Il démontre que l'Internet est un outil 
qui peut être utilisé pour mobiliser la volonté politique, la promotion et la protection 
de l'idéologie de courant dominant de l'Etat. Ce document affirme qu'il existe de 
nombreuses utilisations possibles de la censure et de la surveillance par le 
gouvernement. En conclusion, l'Internet peut être considéré comme politique. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
New technologies and innovations always change our socio-political world in dramatic and unexpected 
ways. The internet has considerably altered our social and political life faster than any other 
technological innovation in the twentieth century. Participation in politics has been transformed because 
of the internet, especially major active social networking websites and political blogs. 
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Recently, Internet consumption has increased significantly. At the beginning, the internet seemed to be 
a privilege for a very small group of people due to its expensive cost; however, it has become accessible 
for almost everyone, especially the middle-class. 
This change has affected information control, which was centralized by a government in the past 
because the internet offers people an unlimited source of information and a place to speak out. In other 
words, information dissemination is democratized by the internet. In many developing states, the 
internet is perhaps a threat to the government because most developing states are still in the 
nation-building process and have many sensitive issues, such as national security. There are many 
discussions about sensitive issues in the internet sphere, despite the states’ attempt to restrict online 
collaboration about the issues. Many states have responded to these challenges by imposing strict 
censorship and surveillance on the internet. 
Like other developing states, the internet has now become common in Thailand, and the flow of 
information and discussions about political opposition and sensitive issues are increasingly in the 
internet sphere. As a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, Thailand has many delicate issues and political 
conflicts. The Thai government has often censored and monitored political blogs, alternative news 
websites, and social networking websites like Facebook. At the same time, the Thai government has also 
used the internet as a political tool for promoting and protecting the mainstream political ideology, Royal 
Nationalism. 
This article will address the role of the internet in Thai political conflicts, and explain theories on 
censorship and surveillance as well as the function of the Thai government in censorship and 
surveillance. 
 
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY THAI 
POLITICS 
 
Democracies comes in many forms, but their common basis is an election. Without an electoral process, 
it cannot be claimed that there is democracy because democracy is the rule of the majority. That is the 
reason why I argue that a political regime in Thailand is bureaucratic-authoritarian regime since it had 
both de jure and de facto coup d'état in recent years. 
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism is an approach for explaining political phenomenon and regimes in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America in the late 1960s (Wiarda, 2000, p. 87-89). In my opinion, it would be 
easier to understand bureaucratic-authoritarianism if we call it “military in politics” because it indicates 
that the military carries out a coup d'état and has a significant leadership role in politics. However, the 
military cannot mount a successful coup d'état without support from civilians. The reason which the 
military and the ally, civilian elites, claim for their legitimacy to intervene in politics is always the 
corruption of politicians. Still, only cooperation with civilian elites and nothing else is not enough to 
overthrow a democratic government in the context of contemporary Thailand. A signal from the palace is 
also a necessary element. The Thai bureaucratic-authoritarian regime demands the control of the lower 
classes in order to maintain its power. 
The political regime of Thailand has returned to a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime since the coup on 
19 September 2006, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. The coup was also strongly supported by the 
Bangkok-based middle class, royalists and network monarchy which General Prem Tinsulanonda, the 
head of the Privy Council, is the major symbol of.  Despite the fact that there were two democratic 
governments which came from elections, both could not bring the military under control. On the contrary, 
it was the military that had more influence on the governments. The 19 September 2006 coup is a de jure 
coup d'état; however, there was a de facto coup d'état after that. 
I argue that the main reason that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra from his office in 2006 is neither 
corruption nor capital cronyism, but breaking the de facto rule of Royal Nationalism, the mainstream 
political ideology in Thailand. His behavior and policies challenged the traditional manners of Thai 
politicians; for example, Thaksin’s populist policies were suspect because it was thought that that they 
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might replace royal projects in rural areas which have been under royal patronage. 
In my point of view, two democratic governments led by Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat 
could not govern the country, so both had to leave their office for the same reason, but for different 
reasons. Both Samak and Somchai were perceived as Thaksin’s nominees. Hence, their governments 
were also a threat to Royal Nationalism. 
The de facto coup d'état occurred late in 2008 after the dissolution of the People’s Power Party. The de 
facto coup was led by General Anupong Paochinda, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army. 
He invited politicians to have a meeting with him about a political situation. The aftermath was a change 
in political factions in the House of Representatives, and Abhisit Vejjajiva became the prime minister of 
Thailand. There is no doubt that the government led by Abhisit is backed by the military, royalists and 
network monarchy; however, it has stirred up animosity and sparked a massive protest by the 
pro-Thaksin camp, which consists of rural residents and anti-coup protesters. This camp has been called 
the Red-Shirts; however the official name is the National United Front of Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD).  
Apart from the Red-Shirts, there are the Yellow-Shirts or the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). 
It consists of Bangkok-based middle class, royalists and network monarchists that have supported the 
coup by the military for protecting the mainstream ideology and the palace. The Yellow-Shirts made 
massive protests in 2005-2008. Yet, besides the Red and the Yellow, there is a group of the Multi-Color 
Shirts, which are really not different from the Yellow. 
The massive protests have been out of control since 2009. The Red started the heavy protests in 
Bangkok, and it has started to resort to escalating violence. The casualties were caused from the political 
violence by both protesters and government. Some academics stated that the situation, especially in 
April and May 2010, is not just a riot but a civil war. 
The interesting feature of the current political conflicts is the role of the internet, which is used as a 
political tool by all camps and the government. The internet is an important factor and tool in the protests. 
And it is also a powerful political tool of the government both in promoting and protecting Royal 
Nationalism and the palace and handling the protesters. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN CONTEMPORARY THAI 
POLITICAL CONFLICTS 
 
Internet users are actively involved in expressing public sentiment about political situations. The speed 
at which the users are able to respond to current events offers content creation which provides different 
information from what we could see and hear in traditional media that was strictly controlled by the 
government. The users alter political mobilization efforts and in some instances minimize and eliminate 
limitations of communication caused by geographical boundaries and the space of miles. Now politics is 
no longer bounded by geography in the way it once was. 
Online mobilization efforts consist of raising awareness through posts, circulating e-petitions, and 
sometimes soliciting monetary contributions. These efforts are often translated from online efforts to 
traditional offline forms of political participation (Pole, 2010, p. 16). 
The internet unites the users by forming loose networks. In this context, network refers to associations 
or affiliation of groups of individuals who have common interests and political perspectives. According 
to Pole (2010), we can classify these networks into three types: individual and group identity, topical 
interests, and ideology. 
In this section, I will focus on the political ideology’s internet networks in the way it has roles in 
contemporary Thai political conflicts. First, I will examine the networks of the major camps, the Red and 
the Yellow. Next I will explore major active social networking websites and political blogs as far as their 
role in the conflicts. 
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Both the Red and the Yellow have their own internet websites which are the main instrument for 
stimulating and mobilizing their supporters. For the Red, the main website is www.uddthailand.com, and 
it has many networks such as www.rakdang.com. For the Yellow, the major website is 
www.manager.co.th and www.managerradio.com, which are owned by Manager Group. The enterprises 
have been founded by Sondhi Limthongkul, who is the prominent leader of the Yellow. Both have a live 
video for broadcasting their protest activities. Therefore, it looks like a reality show so that the 
supporters of both sides feel no need to participate the protest at the real place; they can be a visual 
protester. Conversely, they can participate in the protest quickly if their leaders ask, because they can 
acknowledge the situation all the time via the internet. 
However, the main internet networks of the both camps are always blocked by the government, 
especially the Red due to information related to sensitive issues, and its opposition to the government. 
The internet users who can’t access their favorite political websites have to use an alternative means such 
as major active social networking websites and political blogs. 
I argue that a major active social networking website in Thailand currently is Facebook. Anyone who 
confirms themselves to be over the age of 13 with a valid e-mail address can become a Facebook user. 
Facebook offer a network for individuals who share similar ideological perspectives. And Facebook 
users can always post their comments and update about the political situation. They also promote their 
networking users to participate in online mobilization and sometimes offline mobilization. For example, 
when Anuthee Dejthevaporn, the Secretary-General of the Student Federation of Thailand (SFT), and his 
colleagues who supported the Red’s protest were summonsed by the Centre for the Resolution of the 
Emergency Situation (CRES), there were many posts on Facebook to call for offline mobilization to 
support them. 
Political blogs have also prevailed in Thailand recently. Bloggers are able to write about political 
issues in a meaningful way that is perhaps different from what we have known. Many websites provide 
blogging services such as the Nation and Prachatai. 
Although social networking websites and political blogs are alternative internet networks, both also 
may be censored and monitored due to the many comments that are within the scope of sensitive issues. 
Some Facebook users and bloggers were accused of insulting the King and members of royal family. 
In the next section I will illustrate theoretical approaches about censorship and surveillance. 
 
CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE THEORIES 
 
The Censorship and Surveillance Theories I will illustrate here are Deibert’s internet content filtering 
theory and Foucault’s panopticism. In my perspective, both can explain the role of the Thai government 
in the internet sphere. 
According to Deibert (2009), we can classify the internet content filtering into 3 approaches: Inclusion 
filtering, Exclusion filtering, and Content analysis. 
First, Inclusion filtering is the approach where users are allowed to access a short list of approved sites, 
know as a white list only. All other content is blocked. Second, Exclusion filtering is the approach that 
restricts user access by blocking sites listed on a black list. All other content is allowed. Third, Content 
analysis is the approach that restricts user access by dynamically analyzing the content of a site and 
blocking sites that contain forbidden keywords, graphics or other specific criteria (Deibert, 2009, p. 
325). 
I would like to detail the Content Analysis approach; it refers to techniques used to control access to 
information based on its content, such as the inclusion of specific keywords on a website or the address 
of a URL (Deibert, 2009, p. 325). 
Deibert also indicates that many countries justify their censorship practices as a way to block access to 
pornography or other culturally sensitive material, but his research has documented a large and growing 
swathe of content beyond pornography that is targeted for filtering. At least 14 countries, including 
Thailand, blocked access to content that spans the major categories of political, social, conflict-related, 
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and security content (Deibert, 2009, p. 327). 
Apart from Deibert’s internet content filtering theory, Foucault’s panopticism is also a useful concept 
for explaining surveillance. 
The term panopticon means all-seeing place. It stems from political philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous architectural design for a highly efficient prison which maximizes the controlling of prisoners 
with a minimal staff (Chadwick, 2006, p. 260-261; Gutting, 2005, p. 82-84). 
Panopticism is based upon principles of scientific measurement and control through empirical 
observation rather than brute force. Therefore, panopticism alerts us to five critical features of electronic 
surveillance: efficiency through automation, impersonality, ubiquity, preemption, and social discipline 
(Chadwick, 2006, p. 262). An achievement of panopticism is creating docile bodies which are produced 
through a strict regimen of disciplinary acts. 
Next I will apply the theories to investigate the role of the Thai government in censoring and 
monitoring the internet sphere. 
 
 CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE IN THAILAND 
 
As I already mentioned, Thailand has many sensitive issues, especially the issue related to the King and 
the members of royal family; in that area the government has a strict role in censorship and surveillance. 
According to Deibert (2009), Thailand has started an effort to block pornography, but it has been 
gradually broadened to include politically sensitive websites as well, since the 19 September 2006 coup. 
In addition, Thailand always blocks websites that satirize the palace. 
I argue that the censorship and surveillance in Thailand mainly stems from Royal Nationalism, the 
mainstream political ideology. Websites that contain contents which tend to resist the tradition are 
always closely monitored and censored. Therefore the major type of internet filtering used in Thailand is 
the Content Analysis approach. 
Take the Samesky website case for example; it was accused of insulting the King and the members of 
the royal family. The Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) has implicated it in a 
plot to overthrow the monarchy. Apart from the Samesky website, then Prachatai website case is also 
interesting. Prachatai is the alternative news website that always criticizes the government and supports 
the Red. The Red was connected to the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who has been 
accused of not being loyal to the Royalty. Any websites that are related to the Red are observed closely 
and blocked. Prachatai is one of those websites. It has been blocked multiple times. 
Besides the websites that have already been mentioned, social networking websites and political blogs 
are also heavily surveilled at this time. Recently, a Facebook user was alleged to have posted comments 
which insulted the King. 
Thailand has the lèse-majesté law for protecting the palace and, of course, maintaining Royal 
Nationalism. Any Thais can sue other Thais because of this allegation. Many internet users have been 
charged. The latest one is the Facebook user I already mentioned. Therefore, Thai internet users are no 
different from prisoners in the panopticon prison; in other words, they are becoming docile bodies. 
Ordinary users in the internet sphere also become like a Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) because 
they observe each other. There are also social sanctions to many users whose comments do not conform 
to the mainstream political ideology. The social sanctions come in many forms such as stigmatization via 
forwarded e-mails and Facebook posts. 
Finally, I would like to state that we come to police ourselves because of the fear that we are constantly 
being monitored. We often have no way of knowing when we can act with real freedom.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The internet has changed our life in many ways, including our socio-political lives. Many people 
suppose the internet sphere is free from any politics and the government; however, in reality, the internet 
is a tool for political mobilization as this article already demonstrated. This article has also exemplified 
the role of the internet in the contemporary Thai political conflicts. 
This article also showed that the internet is a political tool for the government to promote and protect 
the mainstream political ideology of the state. The internet sphere is not without government censorship 
and surveillance, especially in Thailand. 
The article concludes that the internet can be a political tool in many ways; therefore, it cannot be 
neglected as one factor for understanding politics, particularly Thai politics. 
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